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RECENT CASES
CONFLICT OF LAWS-GOVERNMENTAL ACTIVITIES-
RECOGNITION IN FORUM OF SISTER STATE'S
ORIGINAL REVENUE CLAIM
The State of Oklahoma brought an original action in an Arkansas
court to collect income taxes on rentals received by defendant on
mining machinery temporarily located in Oklahoma. Although Okla-
homa qualified to maintain the suit under an Arkansas reciprocity
statute,' defendant demurred on the ground that the statute should
not be applied to a suit based on a tax liability which accrued before
the effective date of the statute. The demurrer was sustained. On
appeal, held, reversed. An action by a sister state to collect taxes ow-
ing that state is maintainable in the courts of Arkansas even in the
absence of statute. Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission v.
Neely, 282 S.W.2d 150 (Ark. 1955).
The legal maxim that "one country will not take notice of the
revenue laws of another" came to this country from England,2 where
it originated during England's period of world commercial leadership.
3
The doctrine was 'first given effect here in regard to foreign revenue
laws, as distinguished from those of a sister state of the union.4 How-
ever, it soon was extended to sister states in an early New Hampshire
dictum.5 One of the first direct adoptions of this rule was made by
a New York court in an original action by the State of Maryland to
collect a personal property tax. The court sustained the defendant's
demurrer, on the ground that sister states are to be treated as foreign
countries and one country will not enforce the revenue laws of
anotlher.6 This rationale was further developed in a leading case,
Colorado v. Harbeck,7 in which a claim by Colorado based on an in-
heritance tax was refused enforcement in the courts of New York.
On the other hand, in an earlier North Carolina case New Jersey
1. ARx. STAT. AxN. §§ 84-3201 to -3203 (Supp. 1953).
2. Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims, 46
HARV. L. REv. 193, 215 (1932). Note, Extra-Territorial Collection of State
Inheritance Taxes, 29 COLUm. L. REv. 782 (1929).
3. Holman v. Johnson, 1 Cowp. 341, 343, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (K.B. 1775)
(dictum).
4. Ludlow v. Van Rensselaer, 1 Johns. R. 94 (N.Y. 1806).
5. Henry v. Sargeant, 13 N.H. 321, 332 (1843) (dictum).
6. Maryland v. Turner, 75 Misc. 9, 132 N.Y. Supp. 173 (Sup. Ct. 1911).
7. 232 N.Y. 71, 133 N.E. 357 (1921); but cf. New York v. Coe Mfg. Co., 112
N.J.L. 536, 172 Atl. 198, 200 (1934) (dictum), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 576 (1935)
(New Jersey gave "full faith and credit" to atax judgment of a New York
court; however, defendant was personally served'within the jurisdiction of
the New Yoik court).
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was allowed to pursue a license fee claim against the receiver of an
insolvent corporation chartered in New Jersey but doing business in
North Carolina and having all its assets there.8 The court held that
under the doctrine of comity New Jersey had standing to sue, but
could not assert the claim as a preferred one under the New Jersey
statute.9
In 1948 Congress amended the federal "full faith and credit" statute
by adding the words "public acts."' 0 However, there are few de-
cisions determining directly whether full faith and credit must be
given to revenue acts of sister states." Although the Supreme Court
has indicated that the full faith and credit requirement does extend, at
least in some situations, to the statutes as well as the judgments of
sister states,12 in Milwaukee County v. White13 the Court said,
"whether one state must enforce the revenue laws of another remains
an open question in this court.'
4
A present trend of allowing sister states to maintain tax collection
suits seems to have had its beginning in a 1946 Missouri decision. 15
The Missouri court, after reviewing the history of the prohibitive
doctrine, concluded that it "has no place in a union of states such as
the United States."'16 Following this decision the Restatement by a
caveat7 modified its previous position supporting the doctrine. 18 The
Missouri holding was followed in a suit brought by Ohio in a Ken-
tucky court.19
The court in the instant case noted that growing state activity de-
mands more state revenue, which in turn produces a greater likeli-
hood of state tax evasion. Because of these factors the court was
quite willing to enforce the revenue laws of a sister state without
resorting to a pertinent local statute. Although the doctrine against
entertainment of such suits is still followed in the majority of jurisdic-
tions, in view of the increasing financial needs of the states and the
high mobility of our population, it seems that the majority will soon
become a minority.20 This result can be accomplished by judicial
8. J. A. Holshouser Co. v. Gold Hill Copper Co., 138 N.C. 248, 50 S.E. 650
(1905).
9. Cf. id., 50 S.E. at 653-54.
10. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738 (1950).
11. See Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1929), aff'd, 281 U.S. 18
(1930) (on grounds that Indiana officer had no capacity to sue in another state),
5 IND. L. J. 625.
12. See Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
13. 296 U.S. 268 (1935) (action on a judgment for default on taxes).
14. Id. at 275.
15. State ex Tel. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Rodgers, 238 Mo. App. 1115, 193
S.W.2d 919, 165 A.L.R. 785 (1946).
16. Id., 193 S.W.2d at 927.
17. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 610 (Supp. 1948).
18. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 610 (1934).
19. Ohio ex rel. Duffy v. Arnett, 314 Ky. 403, 234 S.W.2d 722 (1950).
20. See Goldstein, Interstate Enforcement of the Tax Laws of Sister States,




decision,21 by enactment of reciprocity statutes,22 or by an interpreta-
tion of the 1948 Congressional amendment as requiring that full faith
and credit be given all legislative acts of sister states2 2
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATE TAXATION OF
INTERSTATE COMMERCE-SALES TAX ON
SHIPBOARD SALES TO PASSENGERS
Plaintiff, a shipper engaged in the transportation of passengers on
the Great Lakes between Michigan, other states, and Canada, resisted
a Michigan sales tax upon sales of food, liquor, postal cards, and novel-
ties aboard plaintiff's ships. The tax, imposed upon sellers for the
privilege of making retail sales in Michigan and measured by the gross
proceeds of such sales, was apportioned to the percentage of time
plaintiff's ships were in Michigan waters. Plaintiff did not question
the fairness of the apportionment but asserted that all sales on all trips
were made in interstate or foreign commerce and that the tax thereon,
regardless of apportionment, was prohibited by the commerce clause
of the federal constitution. Held: The tax is valid as applied to
plaintiff because it is imposed upon retail sales consummated in
Michigan, a local activity sufficiently distinct from plaintiff's inter-
state transportation to be made subject to state taxation. Detroit &
Cleveland Nay. Co. v. Michigan Dep't of Revenue, 342 Mich. 234,
69 N.W.2d 832 (1955).
The Supreme Court, in determining whether a state tax creates an
unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce, must weigh two con-
flicting policies: preservation of the Constitution's mandate that trade
between the states be permitted to flow freely within the national
boundaries, and maintenance of the autonomy of the states through
financial independence.' In reaching its decisions the Court has laid
down many different tests and formulae;2 but as perplexing as the
decisions may be, there are certain well-recognized objections to
state taxation of interstate commerce.3
21. See note 14 supra.
22. Instant case, 282 S.W.2d at 150-51.
23. See note 10 supra.
1. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157 (1954).
2. In this field it is difficult and probably impractical to lay down definite
rules because of the complexities involved in the many situations which arise.
See Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946) where the Court said,
"Suffice it to say that especially in this field opinions must be read in the
setting of the particular cases and as the product of preoccupation with their
special facts."
3. See HARTMAN, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE 49 (1953);
Hartman, Sales Taxation in Interstate Commerce, 9 VAND L. REV. 138 (1956).
See also, Barrett, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 4 VAND. L. REV.
19561
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It is well settled that a state may not tax a corporation for the
privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, because Congress has
the exclusive power to regulate commerce among the states.4 Also, a
tax will not be allowed which reaches beyond the borders of the taxing
state5 or discriminates against interstate commerce.6 Yet the states
may tax a business which crosses state lines if there is a local incident
or activity which may be deemed sufficiently separated from interstate
commerce to give the state power to tax. 7 Thus, a state may impose
a tax on the privilege of selling, and use interstate gross receipts as
a means of computing the tax, if the sale is a sufficiently local activ-
ity.8 Gross receipts may be used to establish the value of the local
event for tax purposes, and the fact that the gross receipts include re-
ceipts from both interstate and intrastate sales will not affect the
validity of the apportionment.9
Although at times the Supreme Court has seemed to disregard the
states' needs for revenue in freeing interstate commerce from taxes,10
at other times activities indispensible to the actual interstate com-
merce itself have been deemed taxable local activities" with the idea
expressed that interstate commerce must pay its way.'2 At the other
496 (1951); Lockhart, Gross Receipts Taxes on Interstate Transportation
and Communication, 57 Haxv. L. Rsv. 40 (1943); Powell, More Ado About
Gross Receipts Taxes, 60 HAmv. L. REv. 501, 710 (1947).
4. Spector Motor Serv. Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951); Alpha Port-
land Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203 (1925); Crutcher v. Kentucky,
141 U.S. 47 (1891).
5. Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1951).
6. Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946).
7. "[F]rom the viewpoint of the Commerce Clause, where the corpora-
tions carry on a local activity sufficiently separate from the interstate com-
merce, state taxes may be validly laid, even though the exaction from the
business of the taxpayer is precisely the same as though the tax had been
levied upon the interstate business itself." Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone,
335 U.S. 80, 87 (1948).
8. Chicago v. Willett Co., 344 U.S. 574 (1953); Norton Co. v. Department of
Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1951).
9. See International Harvester v. Evatt, 329 U.S. 416, 422 (1947) where
the Court said, '"Furthermore, this Court has long realized the practical im-
possibility of a state's achieving a perfect apportionment of expansive, com-
plex business activities such as those of appellant, and has declared that
'rough approximation rather than precision' is sufficient."
10. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
11. Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948); Coverdale v.
Arkansas Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 303 U.S. 604 (1938); Utah Power &
Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932). But see Joseph v. Carter & Weeks
Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1947).
12. In 1938 Mr. Justice Stone, recognizing the need for state revenue, rein-
terpreted previous cases and, maintaining that interstate commerce must
be made to pay its way, he set forth the "cumulative burdens doctrine."
Western Live Stok v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938). But see Free-
man v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946); Braniff Airways v. Nebraska State Bd.,
347 U.S. 590, 607 (1954) (Mr. Justice Frankfifrter, dissenting, said, "The
appealing phrase that 'interstate business must payits way' can be invoked
only when we know what the 'way' is for which interstate business must pay").
See also, Comnment; Taxation: New Developments in State Taxation of Gross
Receipts from Interstate -Commerce, 27 CAlm. L. REv. 336 (1939)o; Note, The
Multiple Burden Theory in Interstate Commere Taxation,'40 COLuM. L. REv.
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extreme the Court has declared that a state may not be allowed "one
single-tax-worth of direct interference with the free flow of com-
merce. An exaction by a State from interstate commerce falls not be-
cause of a proven increase in the cost of the product. What makes
the tax invalid is the fact that there is interference by a State with the
freedom of interstate commerce."' 3
The court in the instant case found that a sale consummated locally,
though incidentally involved in interstate commerce, is a taxable local
event. In reaching this conclusion the court relied heavily upon
McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co.,14 a Supreme Court de-
cision in which delivery of goods at the end of an interstate journey
under a contract of sale, was deemed a taxable local event.'5 'The
court admitted that the situation in the instant case is not analogous
to that in the Berwind-White case, for there the sale was between
parties in different states and was itself the interstate commerce. In
the instant case the transportation of passengers was the interstate
commerce-and the sale of goods merely an incident of that trans-
portation.16 No case involving similar facts has come before the
Supreme Court.'7 Although the interstate transportation of passengers
clearly may not be directly taxed,18 other activities just as essential
to interstate transportation as the sale of food and goods to passengers
have been made the subject of state privilege taxes: e.g., taxes on
the fuel and power used to propel a commodity of commerce 9 and
taxes upon other instrumentalities used in commerce.20 The situation
in the instant case does not seem essentially different from the travel
of people across state lines by land or air transportation, yet no case
has been found which even suggests that such travelers are not sub-
ject to a tax on food and drink consumed while traveling.
653 (1940); Note, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: The Western Live
Stock Case, 52 HARv. L. REv. 502 (1939).
13. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 256 (1946).
14. 309 U.S. 33 (1940). -
15. "Recent cases in which a taxable sale does not clearly take place within
the taxing state, elements of the transaction occurring in different states,
have presented peculiar difficulties .... "Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S.
340, 345 (1954). Compare Notton, Co. v.Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534
(1951), with International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S.
340 (1944); see also McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S.
33 (1940); McGoldrick v. Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co., 309 U:S. 70 (1940).
16. Instant case, 69 N.W.2d at 836.
-17. See Union Stock Yards, V; State Tax Comm'n, 93 Utah 174, 71 P.,2d 542
(1937) (sales tax upon feed for livestock being transported in interstate com-
merce upheld).
18.-Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1848).
* 19. See note 11 supra.
20. ' We have frequently reiterated'that the Commerce Clause does not
immunize interstate instrumentalities from all state taxation, but that such
commerce may be requirec to..o py .a -nondiscriminatory share of the tax
burden." Braniff Airways v. Nebrgska State.Bd., 347 U.S. 590, 597, 598 (1954.
See also Canton R.R. v. Rogan, 340 U.S. 511, (1951); Ott v. Mississippi Valley
Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169 (1949); Central Grayhoundc2Lines, Inc. v. Mealey,
334 U.S. 653 (1948). But see Southern Pacific Co. v. 0a2Thglier, 306 U.S9. 167,
177 (1938) (usetax); .. .. .
1956 ]
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In determining the validity of state taxes where interstate commerce
is concerned, the Supreme Court has seldom considered the economic
result of the taxes involved. 21 The Court has usually been concerned
with the primary duty of protecting interstate commerce. Because the
need for state revenue has often been overlooked, interstate commerce
has not always been forced to pay its way and exclusively local busi-
ness has been placed at a competitive disadvantage.22 Such a result
would have occurred in the instant case had the tax not been allowed,
as applied to plaintiff's business, since other local business paid the tax.
It would seem that the test of validity should not be whether the ac-
tivity taxed is a "local" activity, for this term by itself has little mean-
ing. In one of its latest decisions the Supreme Court expressed a
better test, stating that the validity of a tax "depends upon other
considerations of constitutional policy having reference to substantial
effect, actual or potential, of the particular tax in suppressing or
burdening unduly the commerce. '23 Unfortunately, however, the Court
did not adopt this criterion but decided that "it is now well settled
that a tax imposed on a local activity related to interstate commerce
is valid if, and only if, the local activity is not such an integral part
of the interstate process, the flow of commerce, that it cannot re-
alistically be separated from it. ' '24
COURTS-CERTIORARI FROM UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT-LOSS OF IMPORTANCE
GROUND FOR DISMISSAL
Defendant, a private cemetery, entered into a contract with plaintiff
for the sale of a burial lot. The contract provided that burial privileges
could accrue only to members of the Caucasian race. Upon defendant's
refusal to allow interment of the body of plaintiff's husband, a non-
Caucasian, plaintiff brought suit to recover damages for breach of
contract. Judgment was given for defendant, and the Supreme Court
21. See note 12 supra.
22. International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340,
349 (1944).
23. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157, 164 (1954).
See also McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 45n .2
(1940). "Despite mechanical or artificial distinctions sometimes taken be-
tween the taxes deemed permissible and those condemned, the decisions
appear to be predicated on a practical judgment as to the likelihood of the tax
being used to place interstate commerce at a competitive disadvantage."
But see Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946) where Mr. Justice Frank-
furter said, "A state is also precluded from taking any action which may
fairly be deemed to have the effect of impeding the free flow of trade between
the states. It is immaterial that local commerce is subjected to a similar
encumbrance. It may commend itself to a State to encourage a pastoral in-
stead of an industrial society."
24. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, supra note 23, at 116.
[ VOL. 9
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of Iowa affirmed.1 The Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari to consider plaintiff's claim that recognition of the contract
provision was unconstitutional state action, and affirmed by a divided
court.2 On petition for rehearing on the same ground, it was revealed
that, subsequent to the time that plaintiff brought her suit, the Iowa
legislature enacted a statute3 prohibiting denial of burial on the basis
of race. Held (5-3), petition granted and the writ of certiorari dis-
missed as improvidently granted. Only in cases involving questions of
public importance should the Court grant a writ of certiorari; where
a statute has been enacted remedying the situation which a petitioner
claims is unconstitutional, the case is of interest to petitioner alone.
Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., 349 U.S. 70 (1955).
Certiorari is distinguished from appeal in that the latter exists as a
matter of right in order that the rights and duties of the particular
litigants be protected and enforced.4 Certiorari is denied, or, if al-
ready granted, is revoked when the case appears moot.5 Concession by
defendant to all plaintiff's demands,6 acquirement by one party of
all interest of the other party in the suit,7 and collusion by the parties
in order to formulate a suit8 are examples of factors which render
a case moot.9 Similarly, certiorari is denied if the issue presented is
not of such recurring nature as to be important to large numbers of
people and, therefore, is not a matter of public interest.10 The discre-
tion to be exercised by the Supreme Court of the United States is
stated in Supreme Court Rule 19: "certiorari ... will be granted only
where there are special and important reasons therefor.""1
The Court in the instant case regarded its prior granting of
certiorari as improvident because subsequent litigation involving the
same issues would be controlled by the recently enacted Iowa statute.
Decision for plaintiff on the constitutional grounds urged by her
1. Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., 245 Iowa 147, 60
N.W.2d 110 (1953).
2. 348 U.S. 880 (1954). Plaintiff's claim was based on the decision in
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), that enforcement by a court of pro-
visions in a private contract constituted state action within the meaning of
the fourteenth amendment.
3. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 566A.1-.11 (1953).
4. SuP. CT. RULE 19.
5. St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41 (1943); cf. United States v.
Alaska S.S. Co., 253 U.S. 113 (1920); United States v. Hamburg American
Line, 239 U.S. 466 (1916); California v. San Pablo & Tulare R.R., 149 U.S. 308
(1893); Cleveland v. Chamberlain, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 419 (1861); Lord v.
Veazie, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 250 (1850).
6. California v. San Pablo & Tulare R.R., 149 U.S. 308 (1893).
7. Cleveland v. Chamberlain, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 419 (1861).
8. Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 250 (1850).
9. See also, Diamond, Federal Jurisdiction to Decide Moot Cases, 94 U. PA.
L. REV. 125 (1946).
10. Layne & Bowler Corp. v. Western Well Works, 261 U.S. 387 (1923);
Magnum Import Co. v. Coty, 262 U.S. 159 (1923) (dictum); Gibbs, Certiorari:
Its Diagnosis and Cure, 6 HASTINGS L. J. 131, 148 (1955).
11. Sup. CT. RuLE 19.
1956 ]
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would require the Court "to pass judgment on Iowa for unconsti-
tutional [state] action ... when it has already rectified any possible
error"' 2 and a decision against plaintiff might "unnecessarily discour-
age... remedial action" by other state legislatures. 13 The dissenting
justices pointed out that the statute "leaves everyone in Iowa free
to vindicate this kind of right except the petitioner.' 4 Citing no
authority, the three justices stated, "This raises a new question of
denial of equal protection of the laws."' 5
It is true that the situation of the plaintiff in the instant case is differ-
ent from that of a plaintiff whose case is moot. However, refusal to
consider plaintiff's claim by revocation of certiorari for lack of
public importance seems no more an injustice than refusal to grant the
petition of any plaintiff for the same reason. In either situation the
plaintiff has had his day in the lower courts on the constitutional
question which he raises. And, laying aside speculation that similar
cases may arise in other states, after enactment of legislation which
will prevent the questioned result from recurring in the courts of the
state from which a case arose, the issue of the constitutionality of that
result is of no public importance, however important it may be to
the particular litigants.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-ADOPTION-REVOCATION OF
CONSENT BY NATURAL PARENTS
Appellees, husband and wife, filed a petition for the adoption of a
minor illegitimate child. The written consent of the natural mother,
who had sole custody of the child, accompanied the petition. Before
the hearing, the mother executed a written revocation of the consent
to appellees and consented to the adoption of the child by appellants.
The trial court rejected the purported revocation and granted the pe-
tition for adoption filed by appellees. On appeal, held, reversed. Con-
sent to adoption given by the natural parents may be withdrawn at
any time prior to the final adoption proceedings. In re Thompson's
Adoption, 283 P.2d 493 (Kan. 1955).
Adoption is a statutory proceeding unknown at common law.1
The adoption statutes in practically all states declare that the natural
parents must consent to the adoption of their child,2 except in cases
12. 349 U.S. at 77.
13. Ibid.
14. Id. at 80.
15. Ibid.
1. Quarles, The Law of Adoption-A Legal Anomaly, 32 MARQ. L. Rsv. 237,
241 (1949). 1 V *.
2. V-murER, ATVRicAN FAMILY LAws 340 (1936).
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of abandonment, 3 in order to validate the adoption proceedings. Few
statutes, however, contain provisions concerning the revocation of
the parent's consent. Three divergent views have been expressed by
American courts as to the effect of an attempted revocation in the
absence of a controlling statute.4 The majority of courts adhere to
an early established rule that the right to revoke a consent is
an absolute right exercisable at any time before the final proceedings.5
A minority have held that a consent, freely given, is irrevocable in the
absence of a showing of good cause.6 But the growing trend is to hold
that revocation is a matter within the discretion of the court.7
In deciding which rule to follow, a court is faced with the problem
of construing its statutes in order to give preference to one class
of person over another. Those courts that follow the majority rule
apply the presumption that the legislature did not intend to abrogate
the common-law rights of the natural parents,8 and reason that since
the natural parents' right to the child is paramount, their consent to
the adoption may be freely revoked.9 On the other hand, those courts
that favor the strict rule against revocation consider that the best
interests of society are thereby served.' 0 They point out that allowing
the withdrawal of consent at the whim or caprice of a parent disrupts
the administrative procedure of adoption and often infringes upon
the rights of those who seek to adopt the children. The courts which
take the intermediate position stress that the adoption statutes were
designed to promote the welfare of the child, and that requiring ap-
3. Emmons v. Dinelli, 125 N.E.2d 446 (Ind. App. 1955); Stanfield v. Wil-
loughby, 269 S.W.2d 270 (Ky. 1954); In re Peter's Adoption, 110 A.2d 825
(Pa. Super. 1955); Deveraux' Adoption v. Brown, 2 Utah 2d 30, 268 P.2d 995
(1954).
4. Annots., 138 A.L.R. 1038 (1942), 156 A.L.R. 1011 (1945).
5. Martin v. Ford, 277 S.W.2d 842 (Ark. 1955) ; Wheeler v. Howard, 211 Ga. 596,
87 S.E.2d 377 (1955); Keheley v. Koonce, 85 Ga. App. 893, 70 S.E.2d 522 (1952);
In re Byrd, 226 La. 194, 75 So. 2d 331 (1954); Haney v. Knight, 78 A.2d 643
(Md. App. 1951); Adoption of Schult, 14 N.J. Super. 587, 82 A.2d 491 (1951);
In re Kozak, 124 N.E.2d 168 (Ohio App. 1955); Boyed v. Wilson, 258 S.W.2d
223 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); Williams v. Liles, 245 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. Civ. App.
1952).
6. Ex parte Barents, 99 Cal. App. 748, 222 P.2d 488 (1950); Mabbitt v. Miller,
68 N.W.2d 740 (Iowa 1955); In re Adoption, of Cannon, 243 -Iowa 828, 53
N.W.2d 877 (1952); Driggers v. Jolley, 219 S.C. 31, 64 S.E.2d 19 (1951); In re
Adoption of Morrison, 260 Wis. 50, 49 N.W.2d 759 (1951).
7. A. v. B., 217 Ark. 844, 233 S.W.2d 629 (1950); In re Adoption of Pitcher,
103 Cal. App. 2d 859, 230 P.2d 449 (1951); Bailey v. Mars, 138 Conn. 593, 87
A.2d 388 (1952); Weisbart v. Berezin, 347 Ill. App. 13, 105 N.E.2d 814 (1952);
Petition of Dickholtz, 341 Ill. App. 400, 94 N.E.2d 89 (1950); Welsh v. Young,
240 S.W.2d 584 (Ky. 1951); Ellis v. McCoy, 124 N.E.2d 266 (Mass. 1954); Adop-
tion of McKinzie, 275 S.W.2d 365 (Mo. App. 1955).
8. VADDEN, DoumSTic RE.LATIONS 355 (1931).
9. In re White's Adoption, 300 Mich. 378, 1 N.W.2d 579 (1942); In re Ander-
son, 189 Minn. 85, 248 N.W. 657 (1933); State ex rel. Platzer v. Beardsley, 149
Minn. 435, 183 N.W. 956 (1921); French v. Catholic Community League, 69
Ohio App. 442, 44 N.E.2d 113 (1942); Fitts v. Carpenter, 124 S.W.2d 420 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1939); In re Nelms, 153 Wash. 242, 279 Pac. 748 (1929).
10. Adoption of. a Minor, 144 F.2d 644 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Westendorf v.
Westendorf, 187 Iowa 659, 174 N.W. 359 (1919); Lee v.. Thomas, 297 Ky. 858,
181 S.W.2d 457 (1944); Wyness v. Crowley, 292 Mass. 461, 198 N.E. 758 (1935).
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proval of the revocation by the court insures the maximum protection
of the child's interests." These courts have generally been inclined to
allow revocation when the interests of others have not intervened
and no one has suffered detriment by relying upon the consent; always,
however, the best interest of the child is the primary consideration.
The court in the instant case interpreted the statutes of Kansas
in favor of the natural parents' rights and adopted the majority rule,
but in so doing may have placed the welfare of the child in a sub-
ordinate position. The more flexible discretionary rule seems better
suited to effectuate the purposes of the adoption laws. Perhaps the
solution is legislative enactment of specific provisions governing rev-
ocation, as has been done in a few states. 12 Otherwise, the adminis-
trative agency responsible for adoptions may be seriously hampered, to
the detriment of the children and society at large.
EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY-EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE
OBTAINED BY UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Most of the incriminating evidence introduced at defendant's trial
for conspiring to engage in horse-race bookmaking was obtained by
microphone installations at places occupied by defendant, and by
numerous forcible entries and seizures without search warrants. The
evidence was admitted over defendant's objection, and the jury found
him guilty. On appeal from an order denying a new trial, held, re-
versed. Evidence obtained in violation of a constitutional guaranty'
against unreasonable search and seizure is inadmissible. People v.
Cahan, 282 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1955).
At common law it is well settled that evidence otherwise admissible
will not be excluded because illegally acquired.2 A majority of the
11. A. v. B., 217 Ark. 844, 233 S.W.2d 629 (1950); Adoption of Pitcher, 103
Cal. App. 2d 859, 230 P.2d 449 (1951); Bailey v. Mars, 138 Conn. 593, 87 A.2d
388 (1952); Weisbart v. Berezin, 347 Ill. App. 13, 105 N.E.2d 814 (1952);
Petition of Dickholtz, 341 Ill. App. 400, 94 N.E.2d 89 (1950); Welsh v. Young,
240 S.W.2d 584 (Ky. 1951); Ellis v. McCoy, 124 N.E.2d 266 (Mass. 1954);
Adoption of McKinzie, 275 S.W.2d 365 (Mo. App. 1955).
12. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-117 (1955); State ex rel. A v. Licensed Child-
Placing Agency, 194 Tenn. 400, 250 S.W.2d 776 (1952).
1. U.S. CONST. amends. IV, XIV; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19.
2. "[T]hough papers and other subjects of evidence may have been illegally
taken from the possession of the party against whom they are offered, or
otherwise unlawfully obtained, this is no valid objection to their admissibility
if they are pertinent to the issue. The court will not take notice how they
were obtained, whether lawfully or unlawfully, nor will it form an issue
to determine that question." 1 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 254a (16th ed. 1899).
"An evidential fact, otherwise admissible, is not excluded: (1) Because it had
been obtained by means of some violation of the Law, (2) nor because its
existence is attended with some violation of the Law." WIGMORE, POCKET CODE
oF EVIDENcE, Rule 197 (1910).
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states follow the rule that evidence is not rendered inadmissible by
reason of the fact that it may have been obtained in violation of a
constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures.3
It has been held by state courts that admission of such evidence does
not contravene constitutional guaranties against self-incrimination 4
nor the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment;5 recently the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not prohibit
admission in the state courts. 6 However, the federal courts seem defi-
nitely committed to the view that evidence obtained by illegal search
and seizure is not admissibles and a number of states have adopted
the federal rule.8 Evidence obtained by private persons or officers un-
sanctioned by judicial process is not inadmissible under this rule.9
Evidence obtained by illegal searches and seizures of state officers
without the co-operation of federal authorities is admissible in the
federal courts;10 in those states which have adopted the federal rule,
evidence illegally obtained by federal officials is admissible."
The exclusionary rule is designed to deter unlawful police conduct
and to enforce constitutional guaranties against unreasonable search
and seizure. However, the rule has two major limitations.12 Be-
cause protection may be claimed only by the person aggrieved by an
3. Banks v. State, 207 Ala. 179, 93 So. 293, 24 A.L.R. 1359 (1921), cert. de-
nied, 260 U.S. 736 (1922); State v. Griswold, 67 Conn. 290, 34 Atl. 1046, 33
L.R.A. 227 (1896); Johnson v. State, 152 Ga. 271, 109 S.E. 662, 19 A.L.R. 641
(1921); State v. Dillon 34 N.M. 366, 281 Pac. 474, 88 A.L.R. 340 (1929); People
v. Adams, 176 N.Y. 351, 68 N.E. 636, 63 L.R.A. 406, 98 Am. St. Rep. 675 (1903),
af'd, 192 U.S. 585 (1904); State v. Atkinson, 40 S.C. 363, 18 S.E. 1021, 42 Am.
St. Rep. 877 (1894); State v. Aime, 62 Utah 476, 220 Pac. 704, 32 A.L.R. 375
(1923).
4. Shields v. State, 104 Ala. 35, 16 So. 85, 53 Am. St. Rep. 17 (1894); State
v. Dillon, 34 N.M. 366, 281 Pac. 474, 88 A.L.R. 340 (1929).
5. Banks v. State, 207 Ala. 179, 93 So. 293, 24 A.L.R. 1359 (1921), cert. de-
nied, 260 U.S. 736 (1922).
6. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
7. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927); Agnello v. United States, 269
U.S. 20 (1925); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383 (1914).
8. State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43, 254 Pac. 788, 52 A.L.R. 463 (1927); People
v. Castree, 311 Ill. 392, 143 N.E. 112, 32 A.L.R. 357 (1924) ; Youman v. Common-
wealth, 189 Ky. 152, 224 S.W. 860, 13 A.L.R. 1303 (1920); People v. Weaver,
241 Mich. 616, 217 N.W. 797, 58 A.L.R. 733 (1928); Orick v. State, 140 Miss.
184, 105 So. 465, 41 A.L.R. 1129 (1925); State v. Owens, 302 Mo. 348, 259 S.W.
100, 32 A.L.R. 383 (1924); Hughes v. State, 145 Tenn. 544, 238 S.W. 588, 20
A.L.R. 639 (1922); State v. Kinnear, 162 Wash. 214, 298 Pac. 449, 74 A.L.R. 1400
(1931); State v. Wills, 91 W. Va. 659, 114 S.E. 261, 24 A.L.R. 1398 (1922);
Allen v. State, 183 Wis. 323, 197 N.W. 808, 39 A.L.R. 782 (1924).
9. State v. Barela, 23 N.M. 395, 168 Pac. 545, 1918B L.R.A. 844 (1917).
10. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
11. State v. Gardner, 77 Mont. 8, 249 Pac. 574, 52 A.L.R. 454 (1926). But see,
Rea v. United States, 76 Sup. Ct. 292 (1956) (federal agent enjoined from
testifying in state case with respect to narcotics obtained in illegal search).




illegal search,13 police and prosecutors familiar with the rule know
that they may rummage anywhere for evidence against a suspect
except among his belongings or in his home.14 Further, because the pro-
tection extends only to actions by the particular government or its
agents, 5 the courts are said to have no power to protect the people
against illegal searches of other agencies, or to censure or nullify those
acts.16 Some authorities have felt that the rule of exclusion, academi-
cally designed for improvement of police methods, has in practical ap-
plication conduced to serious police misbehavior, and has fostered,
rather than diminished, lawless police practices. 17 In Michigan, where
at least one fourth of those persons found carrying concealed weapons
were allowed to go free, the rule proved so unsatisfactory that the
state constitution was amended to end it.18
The court in the instant case considered the effects of its prior ad-
herence to the common-law rule of admissibility, and overruled a long
line of decisions to adopt the exclusionary rule. 9 Professor Wigmore,
13. Kelly v. United States, 61 F.2d 843, 845 (8th Cir. 1932).
14. Fraenke, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 HARV. L. REV. 361, 375
(1921) condemned the limitation on this ground: "This last ruling [referring to
Haywood v. United States, 268 Fed. 795 (7th Cir. 1920)], it is submitted,
is at variance with both the letter and spirit of the Constitution, as it
ignores the security given to the papers and effects as well as to the houses
of the people, and because it permits the government to benefit by illegal
search so long as it is careful not to take property from the possession of
its owners."
15. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 153 (1833).
16. "The record shows that what [the policemen] did by way of arrest and
search and seizure was done before the finding of the indictment in the
Federal court, under what supposed right or authority does not appear.
What remedies the defendant may have had against them we need not in-
quire, as the Fourth Amendment is not directed to individual misconduct
of such officials. Its limitation reaches the Federal Government and its
agencies." Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
17. Waite, Comment, 42 MicH. L. REV. 679, 685 (1944), states that if the
rule of exclusion did not actually beget the "tip-over raid," it nourished
that vicious practice to its evil florescence. Waite, who during the last
years of prohibition participated in various police raids and witnessed the
smashing of property so as to drive the illegal operators out of business,
concludes that the net consequences of the rule was a police alternative of
"harrassing" some operators out of business, or of letting more of them
operate.
18. "Michigan courts quickly applied the rule to evidence of carrying con-
cealed weapons. Here it well nigh blocked the machinery of social protec-
tion. . . . Without going into detail here, suffice it to say that during one
year 1,347 robberies with arms were reported, 237 persons were Prosecuted
for the felony of carrying concealed weapons and only 134 were convicted .
All told, it is safe to say that at least one-fourth of all the guilty gun-toters
discovered and arrested during the year escaped any penalty, not because they
were innocent, but solely because of the judge-made rule that evidence of
their guilt could not be used. So intolerable was the evil that the people of
Mchigan amended their constitution to end it." Waite, supra note 17, at 687,
688.
19. 'The law in California is well settled that any illegality in the procure-
ment of evidence is immaterial to its admissibility unless the presence of
certain conduct brings it within the "brutal and shocking" rule of the
Rochin case (referring to Rochin v. California, 243 U.S. 25 (1949), where the
United States Supreme Court held that evidence obtained by causing the
defendant to regurgitate capsules was a shock to the conscience and a violation
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in stating the reason for this prior position,20 satirized what he be-
lieved to be the manifest folly of .the federal rule.21 Apparently,
however, the common-law rule resulted in flagrant violations of
constitutional principles,2 2 leading the court to believe that neither
administrative, criminal, nor civil remedies are effective in sup-
pressing lawless searches and seizures. This conclusion has been
reached by other authorities, who point out that civil suits for
damages have seldom been undertaken even by innocent search
victims,2 tliat an effective statutory remedy has rarely been pro-
vided,24 and that governments have uniformly failed to prosecute the
wrongdoers.2 The California court, having adhered to the common-
law rule for many years, found it necessary to adopt the rule of
exclusion in order to protect both the rights guaranteed by constitu-
tional provisions and the interest of society in the suppression of
crime.
of the due process clause.). However, this rule has been so narrowly re-
stricted by the California courts that it made no substantial change in the pre-
viously accepted law. In view of the consistency of California decisions from
1896 to 1954 any major alteration in this law should be made by the legislature
and not the courts." Comment, 5 HASTINGS L.J. 227, 235 (1954).
20. "A judge does not hold court in a street-car to do summary justice
upon a fellow-passenger who fraudulently evades payment of his fare; and,
upon the same principle, he does not attempt, in the course of a specific
litigation, to investigate and punish all offences which incidentally cross the
path of that litigation." 8 WiGMom, EviDENcE § 2183 (3d ed. 1940).
21. "Titus, you have been found guilty of conducting a lottery; Flavius, you
have confessedly violated the constitution. Titus ought to suffer imprison-
ment for crime, and Flavius for contempt. But no! We shall let you both go
free. We shall not punish Flavius directly, but shall do so by reversing Titus'
conviction. This is our way of teaching people like Flavius to behave, and
incidentally of securing respect for the Constitution. Our way of upholding
the Constitution is not to strike at the man who breaks it but to let off
somebody who broke something else." 8 WiGmORE, EviDCENc § 2184 (3d ed.
1940).
22. "Thus, without fear of criminal punishment or other discipline, law en-
forcement officers, sworn to support the Constitution of the United States and
the Constitution of California, frankly admit their deliberate, flagrant acts
in violation of both Constitutions and the laws enacted thereunder. It is
clearly apparent from their testimony that they casually regard such acts as
nothing more than the performance of their ordinary duties for which the
City employs and pays them." People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1955).
23. Comment supra note 12, at 151.
24. Municipalities, like states, are generally not liable in tort, so that
"where there is liability (as in the case of policemen), the fact of financial
irresponsibility is operative and, presumably, conclusive; while, when financial
responsibility exists (as in the case of a city), there is no liability." Hall, The
Law of Arrest in Relation to Contemporary Social Problems, 3 U. CHI.
L. REV. 345, 348 (1936).
25. Lack of prosecutions may derive from- doubt as to whether illegal
search constitutes a punishable crime. See State v. Leathers, 31 Ark. 44
(1876); State v. Wagstaff, 115 S.C. 198, 105 S.E. 283 (1920). Federal officers
have apparently never been prosecuted. CoRNELus, SEARcH AND SEizuaE (2d.
ed. 1930) at p. 45, declares: "[T]he writer has yet to learn of a single instance
where either a state or a federal officer has been prosecuted criminally for
an illegal search and seizure, although extended- inquiry has been made and,




INJUNCTION AGAINST AGENT'S TESTIFYING
IN STATE COURT
Petitioner was indicted for acquiring narcotics in violation of a
federal statute.' The evidence having been obtained under an im-
proper search warrant,2 the federal district court granted petitioner's
motion to suppress, and dismissed the indictment. Thereupon, a fed-
eral narcotics agent caused petitioner to be arrested by New Mexico
officials for possession of narcotics in violation of New Mexico law.
Petitioner moved for an injunction in the federal district court re-
straining the federal agent from testifying in the state case because
the agent's testimony would be based on evidence obtained under an
improper search warrant. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
review a judgment of the court of appeals affirming the district court's
denial of the motion. Held, reversed. A federal agent may be enjoined
from testifying in a state court on the basis of evidence obtained by
him under an improper search warrant. Rea v. United States, 76 Sup.
Ct. 292 (1956).
The fourth amendment, as judicially construed, bars in a federal
prosecution the use of evidence obtained in violation of the amend-
ment's guaranty against unreasonable search and seizure.3 A majority
of the states, however, follow the rule that evidence otherwise ad-
missible will not be excluded by reason of the fact that it may have
been obtained in violation of a state constitutional guaranty,4 and in
Wolf v. Colorado5 the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not pro-
hibit admission in state courts of evidence obtained by an unreasonable
search and seizure. In those states which have adopted an exclusionary
1. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 2593 (a) (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 4744).
2. Rule 41(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in
relevant part as follows: "A warrant shall issue only on affidavit sworn to be-
fore the judge or commissioner and establishing the grounds for issuing the
warrant. If the judge or commissioner is satisfied that grounds for the
application exist or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he
shall issue a warrant identifying the property and naming or describing the
person or place to be searched. The warrant shall be directed to a civil
officer of the United States authorized to enforce or assist in enforcing any
law thereof or to a person so authorized by the President of the United
States. It shall state the grounds or probable cause for its issuance and the
names of the persons whose affidavits have been taken in support thereof."
3. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927); Gouled v. United States, 255
U.S. 298 (1921); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385
(1920); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
4. Banks v. State, 207 Ala. 179, 93 So. 293, 24 A.L.R. 1359 (1921), cert. denied,
260 U.S. 736 (1922); State v. Griswold, 67 Conn. 290, 34 At. 1046 (1896);
Johnson v. State, 152 Ga. 271, 109 S.E. 662, 19 A.L.R. 641 (1921); State v. Dillon,
34 N.M. 366, 281 Pac. 474, 88 A.L.R. 340 (1929); People v. Adams, 176 N.Y. 351,
68 N.E. 636, 63 L.R.A. 406 (1903), af'd, 192 U.S. 585 (1904); State v. Atkin-
son, 40 S.C. 363, 18 S.E. 1021 (1894); State v. Aime, 62 Utah 476, 220 Pac. 704
(1923).
5. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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rule, evidence obtained by federal officials in violation of the fourth
amendment without the cooperation of state officials is not rendered
inadmissible.6 Moreover, in the absence of collusion between state and
federal officials, evidence obtained by state officers in an unreasonable
search and seizure is admissible in the federal courts.
1
In Stefanelli v. Minard8 it was held that the federal courts should
refuse to intervene in state criminal proceedings to prevent the use
of evidence claimed to have been secured by the unreasonable search
and seizure of state officers. In the instant case the dissenting justices,
pointing out that under the Wolf rule the federal courts would not have
intervened had the petitioner been convicted in the state court by use
of evidence obtained under an invalid search warrant, and that under
the instant decision federal interference may be justified when the
state has not yet obtained the evidence, felt that the decision of the
majority modifies the language used in the Stefanelli case. Such a
rule would make the matter simply a race between a state prosecution
and a federal injunction proceeding.
It is not clear upon what grounds the majority of the Court based
its decision. Since Congress has made property seized under a federal
revenue law contraband and subject only to the orders and decrees
of the courts of the United States having jurisdiction thereof,9 it
would seem clear that in the instant case the federal agent would not
have been permitted to make the evidence subject to state authority
by introducing it as evidence in a state court. On that theory, it
would appear that the court in the exercise of its supervisory power
over federal agents refused to permit the same result by testimony
based solely on his description of that property, and thereby sought
to enforce the statute against a person owing obedience to it. But the
dissenting justices apparently assumed that the property, having
been obtained under an invalid search warrant, was not in the custody
of the federal court and, therefore, could have been subjected to state
authority. Such an assumption seems untenable in view of the broad
language employed by Congress in the statute.
It appears, however, that the present decision was founded upon
a violation of the federal statute governing searches and seizures;1°
the result is that a federal agent may not testify in a state court when
his testimony is based on evidence obtained by him under an im-
properly issued federal search warrant. The crux of the problem is
6. State v. Gardner, 77 Mont. 8, 249 Pac. 574, 52 A.L.R. 454 (1926).
7. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
8. 342 U.S. 117 (1951).
9. "All property taken or detained under any revenue law of the United
States shall not be repleviable, but shall be deemed to be in the custody of
the law and subject only to the orders and decrees of the courts of the
United States having jurisdiction thereof." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2463 (1950).
10. See note 2 supra.
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whether the Court would have reached the same result if the property
had been seized without a search warrant but in violation of the con-
stitutional guaranty against unreasonable search and seizure. If the
decision is not based solely on the violation of a federal statute or
the abuse of federal process, then the instant case represents a
modification of the Wolf rule insofar as it excludes from state
prosecutions evidence obtained by federal officials in violation of
the fourth amendment.
INCOME TAXATION-CLAIM OF RIGHT INCOME-TIME OF
DEDUCTION WHEN RESTORATION REQUIRED
Plaintiff, an accrual basis taxpayer, was engaged in the business of
selling burial lots to the public. During the years 1930 through 1941,
plaintiff used all receipts for general corporate purposes and reported
its entire sales as income, notwithstanding both a contractual and
statutory duty to set apart and maintain a perpetual care fund equal
to twenty-five per cent of its gross sales.' In 1942 a lot owner instituted
suit to compel compliance with the fund requirement, and, by agree-
ment, plaintiff deposited four secured notes with a trustee to make
up the deficit. The notes were payable one, two, three and four years
from date, and as they were paid plaintiff deducted the amounts from
gross income in the year of each payment. The Commissioner disallowed
the deductions, asserting that the amounts which plaintiff was bound to
set apart should have been excluded from gross income in the year of
receipt.2 Plaintiff paid the assessed deficiencies and penalties, and
sought recovery. Held: Plaintiff was required by the claim of right
doctrine to report as income the prior years' receipts misappropriated
to its own use, and, having done so, is entitled to a deduction in the
later years for payments actually made to make up the deficit in the
fund. Memphis Memorial Park v. McCann, 133 F. Supp. 293 (M.D.
Tenn. 1955).
The claim of right doctrine had its inception in North American Oil
Consolidated v. Burnet,3 and is essentially a part of the concept that
taxpayers must report their incomes on the basis of annual accounting
periods. 4 The doctrine may be expressed in two parts: (1) receipts
1. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 46-110 to 117 (1955) (formerly TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 3919-36 (Williams 1934)).
2. The Commissioner argued that the proceeds from sales during the prior
years were, to the extent of 25% of gross sales, impressed with a trust. Instant
case at 297. "Admittedly, receipts by a trustee expressly for the benefit of
another are not income to the trustee in his individual capacity ..... Healy
v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 278, 282 (1953).
3. 286 U.S. 417 (1932).
4. "It is the essence of any system of taxation that it should produce revenue
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taken under a claim of right and without restriction as to their use,
or receipts with respect to which the taxpayer in fact recognizes no
restriction, must be reported in the year of receipt; (2) the year of
receipt is then closed and if the amount is later returned, adjustment
must be made in the year of return.
The first requirement is essential to any definition of gross income
and usually causes no hardship, although it has prevented accrual basis
taxpayers from deferring income having a future performance lia-
bility,5 a result contrary to accepted accounting principles.6 In the
North American Oil case, the court held that income must be reported
in the year of receipt despite pending litigation attacking the tax-
payer's right to receive it. 7 Most commonly the doctrine has been used
to require the reporting of contingent receipts8 and those which the
taxpayer was later obligated to return.9 In the case of illegal receipts,
inclusion in gross income is required if title to the funds passed.O In a
decision holding that dividends paid contrary to an indenture agree-
ment must be reported as income by the recipient, it was noted that
no law had been violated and the payment was at most the violation
of a private contract.' However, the cases involving illegal receipts
indicate that no distinction is made because a statute was violated;
2
ascertainable, and payable to the government, at regular intervals." Burnet
v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 365 (1931).
5. See, e.g., Curtis R. Andrews, 23 T.C. No. 127 (March 15, 1955) (prepaid
tuition); Wallace A. Moritz, 21 T.C. 622 (1954) (deposits on unfinished photo-
graphs). Corrective legislation giving the taxpayer an election to defer the
prepaid income was subsequently repealed because of problems in the transi-
tion period. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 452, 68A STAT. 152 (later repealed
by 69 STAT. 134 (1955)).
6. Subject to equal criticism is a corollary of the claim of right doctrine
that contingent liabilities may not be deducted through the use of reserve
accounts. Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 193 (1934). Similar corrective legis-
lation was enacted, but likewise repealed. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 462, 68A
STAT. 158 (later repealed by 69 STAT. 134 (1955)).
7. See also Safety Tube Corp. v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 787 (6th Cir.
1948) (royalties received during pendency of patent suit); National City
Bank v. Helvering, 98 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1938) (receipts under investigation by
Senate committee).
8. Gilken Corp. v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 141 (6th Cir. 1949).
9. A relatively frequent application is made to require the inclusion of im-
proper dividend or bonus payments subsequently recovered by the corpora-
tion. See, e.g., United States v. Lesoine, 203 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1953); Griffin
v. Smith, 101 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 561 (1939).
Contra, Knight Newspapers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 1007 (6th Cir.
1944) (harsh result prevented by finding exception based on theory of con-
structive trust).
10. Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952) (proceeds of extortion held
taxable income); Akers v. Scofield, 167 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.) (swindler re-
quired to pay taxes), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 823 (1948), 1 VAND. L. REV. 299
(comment on opinion of district court); Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S.
404 (1946) (embezzled funds held not received under claim of right).
11. St. Regis Paper Co. v. Higgins, 157 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1946), cert denied,
330 U.S. 843 (1947); cf. Bates Motor Transp. Lines, Inc. v. Commissioner, 200
F.2d 20 (7th Cir. 1952).
12. See note 10 supra.
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therefore, the fact that the receipts in the instant case were used in
violation of both contractual and statutory provisions appears unim-
portant.13 With the exception of the requirement that legal title must
pass, it would seem that the test for claim of right income is not based
on legal right, but on the degree of control exercised over the funds
by the recipient. 14
The second part of the doctrine has produced the most inequitable
results by refusing adjustment to the year of receipt if, in a sub-
sequent period, the taxpayer is required to restore claim of right
income.' 5 Although a deduction of the year of restitution is allowed,' 6
obvious inequity arises when the taxpayer's bracket has changed be-
cause of a difference in income level or a change in the tax rate.17 In
this regard, the claim of right cases fit into a larger group under the
heading of transactional problems 18 and are governed by the principle
that each year is a separate unit for tax accounting purposes. 19 This
part of the doctrine aptly illustrates the inherent conflict in our income
tax laws produced by the annual accounting concept. When consist-
ently applied, the concept may distort the taxpayer's income picture;
but any departure to a transactional approach would cause difficulties
in the administration of the taxing statutes.
Remedial legislation has been enacted which allows the taxpayer
the option of taking a deduction in the year of restitution, or comput-
ing his tax for that year without the deduction, then taking a credit
for the amount his earlier taxes were increased by inclusion of the
claim of right income.20 This provision affords relief in most cases,
13. But cf. Midvale Co. v. United States, 129 Ct. Cl. 483, 124 F. Supp. 678
(1954).
14. See Moore v. Thomas, 131 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1942).
15. Healy v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 278 (1953); United States v. Lewis, 340
U.S. 590 (1951). The rule can be traced to a dictum in North American Oil
Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417, 424 (1932).
16. Presumably the deduction would be taken as an ordinary and neces-
sary expense of the trade or business, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a); or an
expense in the production of income, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 212.
17. Other factors which might cause the deduction to be "worth more or
less" in the subsequent year are changes in the substantive law, such as split-
income benefits provided in the Revenue Act of 1948; or a change in taxable
status, such as the taxpayer's marital status.
18. See, e.g., Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931) (taxpayer
required to report all his receipts from government contract work in the
year of receipt, even though his expenses under the contract were incurred
in previous years).
19. One form of legislative relief, designed to correct situations similar to
that in Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., supra note 18, is the provision for net
operating loss carrybacks and carryovers. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 72. The
arbitrary Tax Benefit Rule represents a judicial attempt to give relief when
transactions produce repercussions in later years. See Dobson v. Commissioner,
320 U.S. 489 (1943).
20. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1341. On the theory that administrative dif-
ficulties would outweigh any loss to the taxpayer, the option is limited to de-'
ductions exceeding $3,000. Id. § 1341(a). See H.R. REP,. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. 86-87 (1954) and S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 118 (1954).
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but it has certain express limitations21 and the Government must still
maintain an inconsistent position.2 With respect to a fair distribu-
tion of the tax burden a further limitation is noted when, as in the
instant case, the taxpayer receives a greater benefit from a deduction
in the later year than would have been derived from exclusion in the
year of receipt. It appears that under both the 1939 Code and the
remedial provisions of the 1954 Code, the taxpayer would be entitled
to a windfall deduction in the year of adjustment if the claim of right
income was reported in a year in which there was a net loss for tax
purposes. 23 Although it may cause some administrative problems 24 a
solution fair to both the taxpayer and the treasury lies in a rule re-
quiring inclusion in the year of receipt and adjustment of- that year
if later events show that the amount actually was not income to the
taxpayer.P
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-PRIVILEGE-FILING OF
COMPLAINT WITH BAR ETHICS AND
GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE
Defendant complained to the County Bar Ethics and Grievance
Committee that plaintiff, an attorney, was guilty of improper conduct.
After hearings before the committee and the Supreme Court of New
Jersey, the complaint was dismissed on the ground that plaintiff's
misconduct was committed not while he was acting as attorney, but
while acting as a real estate broker, so that under the present law'
the complaint should have been filed with the New Jersey Real Estate
21. The principal limitation is the express exclusion of transactions incident
to the sale of property held primarily for sale to customers. INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 1341(b). This exclusion would have prevented the taxpayer in the
instant case from obtaining the benefit of the provision if the situation were
such that exercise of the option would have been to his advantage.
22. Under section 1341 (the option provision) adjustment is made in the
year of restitution and the taxpayer receives no interest on the prior tax
payments, presumably because the receipts were properly reported as income
in the prior year; however, the taxpayer may at his election credit against
this year's tax the amount his earlier taxes were increased by inclusion of the
claim of right income, presumably because the receipts were improperly
reported as income in the prior year. See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Douglas in United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590, 592 (1951).
23. Since the 1954 Code leaves the option with the taxpayer, he will elect
according to his own best advantage, which may or may not be fair to the
treasury. See Maurice P. O'Meara, 8 T.C. 622 (1947) (application of the
Tax Benefit Rule in favor of the Commissioner denied).
24. The present statute of limitations on the reopening of an earlier year's
return is three years. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6511 (a). An amendment would
be necessary to allow adjustment of the earlier year in all cases.
25. See Surrey and Warren, The Income Tax Project of the American Law
Institute, 66 HARV. L. REV. 761, 798 (1953).
1. Subsequently this court has assumed jurisdiction in matters involving
unethical conduct of attorneys in non-legal matters. In re Carlsen, 17 N.J.
338, 111 A.2d 393 (1955); In Te Genser, 15 N.J. 600, 105 A.2d 829 (1954).
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Commission. Plaintiff then sought damages for malicious prosecu-
tion, basing his action upon defendant's participation in the prior pro-
ceedings. A motion to dismiss the complaint in this suit was granted.
On appeal, held (5-2), affirmed. The filing of a complaint with a bar
ethics and grievance committee is privileged. Toft v. Ketchum, 18 N.J.
280, 113 A.2d 671 (1955).
The public policy that criminals should be brought to justice de-
mands that both public officials and private citizens be encouraged to
advance the detection and punishment of crime. Therefore, those who
initiate criminal prosecutions must not fear revenge or legal retalia-
tion if they mistakenly accuse and prosecute an innocent person in a
conscientious attempt to see justice done. This does not mean, how-
ever, that baseless and malicious criminal charges may be made with
impunity. To prevent such abuses of the criminal law the civil action
of malicious prosecution was developed.2 The cause of action was
said to arise when one person wrongfully caused another to be prose-
cuted for a crime. Always aware that the exposure and prosecution
of crime must not be impeded, the courts have restricted the action
so that it cannot be a threat to one instituting a criminal proceeding
in good faith. The plaintiff must carry a very heavy burden of proof,
showing: (a) a criminal proceeding instituted or continued by the
defendant against the plaintiff; (b) termination of the proceeding in
favor of the accused; (c) absence of probable cause; 3 and (d) "malice,"
or a primary purpose in instituting the proceeding other than that of
bringing an offender to justice.4 These strict requirements seem
to have achieved their purpose of discouraging malicious and ill-
founded prosecutions without hampering criminal law enforcement.
Although the action originally arose only from criminal proceedings,
many jurisdictions now allow the same or a similar action to be
based on civil,5 and sometimes on administrative proceedings.6
In the instant case the court indicated that, but for defendant's
privilege, the action would have been appropriate.7 But the court
2. PROSSER, TORTS (2d ed. 1955).
3. Probable cause is defined generally as a state of facts which would lead
an ordinary prudent man to believe that the party is guilty of the offense.
McAfee v. Los Angeles Gas & Electric Corp., 215 Cal. 219, 9 P.2d 212, 214
(1932); McGann v. Allen, 105 Conn. 177, 134 Atl. 810, 813 (1926); Hyman v.
New York Cent. R.R., 240 N.Y. 137, 147 N.E. 613, 615 (1925).
4. PROSSER, TORTS 646 (2d ed. 1955).
5. Peerson v. Ashcraft Cotton Mills, 201 Ala. 348, 78 So. 204 (1917);
Ackerman v. Kaufman, 41 Ariz. 110, 15 P.2d 966 (1932); Shaeffer v. O.K. Tool
Co., 110 Conn. 528, 148 Atl. 330, 332 (1930) (dictum); Ahring v. White, 156
Kan. 60, 131 P.2d 699 (1942); Rosenblum v. Ginis, 297 Mass. 493, 9 N.E.2d 525
(1937); Kolka v. Jones, 6 N.D. 461, 71 N.W. 558 (1897); Nashville Union
Stockyards, Inc. v. Grissim, 13 Tenn. App. 115 (M.S. 1930).
6. Melvin v. Pence, 130 F.2d 423 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (proceeding to revoke
license of private detective); National Surety Co. v. Page, 58 F.2d 145 (4th Cir.
1932) (insurance agent); see Stein v. Schimtz, 21 N.J. Misc. 218, 32 A.2d 844
(Sup. Ct. 1943), affd, 137 N.J.L. 725, 61 A.2d 260 (1948).
7. "[U]nder certain circumstances a malicious prosecution may be predicated
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held that "the filing of a complaint with an ethics and grievance com-
mittee is privileged and ... an attorney cannot predicate a malicious
prosecution action or similar suit on it." 8 This conclusion was based on
a fear that the filing of legitimate grievances would be discouraged
by the threat of tort liability. In finding a privilege the court said,
in effect, that the filing of a complaint of unprofessional conduct
against an attorney, however malicious and ill founded, and however
ruinous it may be to the attorney, nevertheless does not afford him a
cause of action or other legal redress. The only deterrent noted by
the court was the possibility that the complainant would be found in
contempt of court.9
The necessity of maintaining efficiency and facility in the operation
of governmental machinery has given rise to the declaration of certain
immunities and privileges more or less analogous to that found in the
instant case, e.g., the privilege afforded judicial and legislative officials
acting in their official capacities, and the immunities sometimes given
prosecuting attorneys, sheriffs, police officers, and certain other public
officials.' 0 These are simply exceptions to the ordinary rules of tort
liability. In the case of public officials, however, the policy in favor
of fearless administration of the law seems more compelling and less
subject to abuse. The instant case cites no authority giving an absolute
privilege to a private citizen, and apparently there is none. On the
contrary, a prior New Jersey decision held that there is no such
privilege," and in an earlier Kentucky case the court did not consider
the question, but dismissed the complaint because there had been
probable cause in the original disbarment proceeding. 12 Although
the plaintiff in the instant case clearly failed to prove lack of
probable cause, the court refused to base its decision on that ground.
The privilege announced by the court, as the dissenting opinion points
out, denies to the attorney relief which would ordinarily be available
to any other member of the community.' 3 The rationale seems to
imply that the public policy in favor of exposing unprofessional con-
duct among attorneys is more urgent than that of bringing criminals
to justice.
upon the institution of other than a judicial action, at least where such pro-
ceedings are adjudicatory in nature and may adversely affect legally pro-
tected interests." Instant case, 113 A.2d at 673.
8. Instant case, 113 A.2d at 675.
9. Ibid.
10. See, e.g., Laughlin v. Garnett, 138 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1943), cert. denied,
322 U.S. 738 (1944) (U.S. attorneys and police officer); Cooper v. O'Connor,
99 F.2d 135 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 643 (1938) (U.S. attorneys);
Coverstone v. Davies, 38 Cal. 2d 315, 239 P.2d 876, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 840
(1952) (sheriff).
11. Stein v. Schmitz, 21 N.J. Misc. 218, 32 A.2d 844 (Sup. Ct. 1943), 42 MicH.
L. REV. 535, affd, 137 N.J.L. 725, 61 A.2d 260 (1948) (without considering
the question of privilege).
12. Lancaster v. McKay, 103 Ky. 616, 45 S.W. 887 (1898).
13. Instant case, 113 A.2d at 678.
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